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The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, Marshall Robert C., Marx Leslie M.


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Автор: Marshall Robert C., Marx Leslie M.
Название:  The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings
ISBN: 9780262525947
Издательство: Wiley
Классификация:
ISBN-10: 0262525941
Обложка/Формат: Paperback
Страницы: 320
Вес: 0.40 кг.
Дата издания: 10.01.2014
Язык: English
Иллюстрации: 13 figures, 12 tables
Размер: 223 x 146 x 15
Читательская аудитория: Professional & vocational
Подзаголовок: Cartels and bidding rings
Ссылка на Издательство: Link
Рейтинг:
Поставляется из: Англии
Описание:

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected.

Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected.

Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent companys efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts -- fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases -- offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection.

The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.




The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy

Автор: Harrington Joseph E.
Название: The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy
ISBN: 0262036932 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780262036931
Издательство: MIT Press
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Цена: 5925.00 р.
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Описание:

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement.

Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement.

The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.


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