"Gavin not only succeeds in disentangling postwar nuclear history from the US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War, but provides a deeper and more complex understanding of the long-term effects of nuclear weapons on Great Power relations." — Matthew Jones ? International Affairs
We are at a critical juncture in world politics. Nuclear strategy and policy have risen to the top of the global policy agenda, and issues ranging from a nuclear Iran to the global zero movement are generating sharp debate. The historical origins of our contemporary nuclear world are deeply consequential for contemporary policy, but it is crucial that decisions are made on the basis of fact rather than myth and misapprehension. In Nuclear Statecraft, Francis J. Gavin challenges key elements of the widely accepted narrative about the history of the atomic age and the consequences of the nuclear revolution.
On the basis of recently declassified documents, Gavin reassesses the strategy of flexible response, the influence of nuclear weapons during the Berlin Crisis, the origins of and motivations for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how to assess the nuclear dangers we face today.
In case after case, he finds that we know far less than we think we do about our nuclear history. Archival evidence makes it clear that decision makers were more concerned about underlying geopolitical questions than about the strategic dynamic between two nuclear superpowers.Gavin's rigorous historical work not only tells us what happened in the past but also offers a powerful tool to explain how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Nuclear Statecraft provides a solid foundation for future policymaking.
Intelligence and security communities have access to an overwhelming amount of information. More data is better in an information-hungry world, but too much data paralyzes individual and institutional abilities to process and use information effectively. Robert Mandel calls this phenomenon "global data shock." He investigates how information overload affects strategic ambiguity, deception, and surprise, as well as the larger consequences for international security. This book provides not only an accessible framework for understanding global data shock and its consequences, but also a strategy to prepare for and respond to information overload.
Global Data Shock explores how information overload facilitates deception, eroding international trust and cooperation in the post-Cold War era. A sweeping array of case studies illustrates the role of data shock in shaping global events from the 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait to Brexit. When strategists try to use an overabundance of data to their advantage, Mandel reveals, it often results in unanticipated and undesirable consequences. Too much information can lead to foreign intelligence failures, security policy incoherence, mass public frustrations, curtailment of democratic freedoms, and even international political anarchy. Global Data Shock addresses the pressing need for improved management of information and its strategic deployment.
"Edward Kaplan's To Kill Nations is a fascinating work that packs a thermonuclear punch of ideas and arguments... The work is suitable for anyone from advanced undergraduates to experts in the field." ? Strategy Bridge
In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950–1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy.
Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.
"Edward Kaplan's To Kill Nations is a fascinating work that packs a thermonuclear punch of ideas and arguments... The work is suitable for anyone from advanced undergraduates to experts in the field." ? Strategy Bridge
In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950–1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy.
Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.
Intelligence and security communities have access to an overwhelming amount of information. More data is better in an information-hungry world, but too much data paralyzes individual and institutional abilities to process and use information effectively. Robert Mandel calls this phenomenon "global data shock." He investigates how information overload affects strategic ambiguity, deception, and surprise, as well as the larger consequences for international security. This book provides not only an accessible framework for understanding global data shock and its consequences, but also a strategy to prepare for and respond to information overload.
Global Data Shock explores how information overload facilitates deception, eroding international trust and cooperation in the post-Cold War era. A sweeping array of case studies illustrates the role of data shock in shaping global events from the 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait to Brexit. When strategists try to use an overabundance of data to their advantage, Mandel reveals, it often results in unanticipated and undesirable consequences. Too much information can lead to foreign intelligence failures, security policy incoherence, mass public frustrations, curtailment of democratic freedoms, and even international political anarchy. Global Data Shock addresses the pressing need for improved management of information and its strategic deployment.
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