Автор: Parfit Название: Reasons and Persons ISBN: 019824908X ISBN-13(EAN): 9780198249085 Издательство: Oxford Academ Рейтинг: Цена: 4038.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание: This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity.
Автор: Snowdon Paul F Название: Persons, Animals, Ourselves ISBN: 0198769997 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780198769996 Издательство: Oxford Academ Рейтинг: Цена: 5226.00 р. Наличие на складе: Поставка под заказ.
Описание: What kind of thing are we? Paul Snowdon`s answer is that we are animals, of a sort. This view-`animalism`-may seem obvious but on the whole philosophers have rejected it. Snowdon argues that animalism is a defensible way of thinking about ourselves. Its rejection rests on the tendency when doing philosophy to mistake fantasy for reality.
Автор: M.G. Forrester Название: Persons, Animals, and Fetuses ISBN: 0792339185 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780792339182 Издательство: Springer Рейтинг: Цена: 27251.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание: Discusses animal rights, obligations concerning future generations, abortion, limiting medical treatment, and euthanasia. This work offers an account of what moral principles are sound, how we can apply them to complex situations, and what makes it reasonable to treat individuals in accordance with particular moral principles.
Автор: Audi Robert Название: Means, Ends, and Persons ISBN: 0190251557 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780190251550 Издательство: Oxford Academ Рейтинг: Цена: 6255.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание: This book is a full-scale account of the morally important ideas of treating persons merely as means and treating them as ends. Audi clarifies these independently of Kant, but with implications for understanding him, and presents a theory of conduct that enhances their usefulness both in ethical theory and in practical ethics.
Two prominent thinkers argue for the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference to be concepts' sole semantic property.
In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the "meaning" of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questions about what concepts are, what form they take in mental processes, and how they connect to the world they are about. In Minds without Meaning, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn review some of the proposals put forward to answer these questions and find that none of them is remotely defensible.
Fodor and Pylyshyn determine that all of these proposals share a commitment to a two-factor theory of conceptual content, which holds that the content of a concept consists of its sense together with its reference. Fodor and Pylyshyn argue instead that there is no conclusive case against the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference as their sole semantic property. Such a theory, if correct, would provide for the naturalistic account of content that cognitive science lacks -- and badly needs. Fodor and Pylyshyn offer a sketch of how this theory might be developed into an account of perceptual reference that is broadly compatible with empirical findings and with the view that the mental processes effecting perceptual reference are largely preconceptual, modular, and encapsulated.
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