Usher, Dan Economics of voting 9781138495432

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Автор: Usher, Dan
Название: Economics of voting
ISBN: 9781138495432
Издательство: Taylor&Francis
Классификация:

Социальная и политическая философия

Политология и политическая философия

Политическая система: демократия

Экономическая теория и философия

Политэкономия

ISBN-10: 1138495433
Обложка/Формат: Paperback
Страницы: 334
Вес: 0.62 кг.
Дата издания: 24.01.2018
Серия: Routledge frontiers of political economy
Язык: English
Иллюстрации: 21 tables, black and white; 51 line drawings, black and white; 51 illustrations, black and white
Размер: 156 x 230 x 22
Читательская аудитория: Undergraduate
Ключевые слова: Political economy, BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / General
Подзаголовок: Studies of self-interest, bargaining, duty and rights
Рейтинг:
Поставляется из: Европейский союз
Описание: The economics of voting is about when, and subject to what qualifications, electoral markets are like ideal commercial markets where universally self-interested behaviour yields outcomes that are in some sense best for society as a whole. Self-interest can be relied upon in voting about the redistribution of income, narrowing the gap between rich and poor, without removing the gap completely, altering people’s ordering on the scale of rich and poor or destroying incentives to work and save. Elsewhere, self-interested voting can lead to inconsistent collective behaviour, and must be supported by bargaining, duty and rights. Bargaining is indispensable in the formation of platforms of political parties, passage of laws in the legislature and other situations where two or more magnitudes must be voted upon simultaneously. Bargaining is ubiquitous but mysterious, with no plausible equilibrium comparable to the equilibrium in competitive markets. A duty to vote arises because the chance of any person’s vote influencing the outcome of an election is too small to justify the time and trouble of voting. Wide-spread abstention is corrosive, but the purely self-interested person abstains. A duty to vote need not require a person to vote for the party seen as best for society as a whole. It may be sufficient to vote for the party seen as best for oneself alone. Rights are the citizen’s defence against exploitation. Unconstrained, majority rule voting allows any majority of the electorate that can vote as a block - a majority identified by race, religion or social class - to expropriate the corresponding minority completely. No government in office and its supporters would risk losing office in an election if loss of office meant destitution at the hands of its successors. Constraints include property rights that may be modified by systematic redistribution but not discarded or altered indiscriminately if democratic government is to be pre

Economics of voting, Usher, Dan