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Автор: Epperly Brad Название: Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorsh ISBN: 0198845022 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780198845027 Издательство: Oxford Academ Рейтинг: Цена: 9504.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание: Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced `insurance` is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
Описание: The politics of division and distraction, conservatives’ claims of liberalism’s dangers, the wisdom of amoral foreign policy, a partisan challenge to a Supreme Court justice, and threats to the constitutionally mandated balance between the three branches of government: however of the moment these matters might seem, they are clearly presaged in events chronicled by Joshua E. Kastenberg in this book, the first in-depth account of a campaign to impeach Supreme Court justice William O. Douglas nearly fifty years ago.On April 15, 1970, at President Richard Nixon’s behest, Republican House Minority Leader Gerald Ford brazenly called for the impeachment of Douglas, the nation’s leading liberal judge—and the House Judiciary Committee responded with a six-month investigation, while the Senate awaited a potential trial that never occurred. Ford’s actions against Douglas mirrored the anger that millions of Americans, then as now, harbored toward changing social, economic, and moral norms, and a federal government seemingly unconcerned with the lives of everyday working white Americans. Those actions also reflected, as this book reveals, what came to be known as the Republicans’ “southern strategy,” a cynical attempt to exploit the hostility of white southern voters toward the civil rights movement. Kastenberg describes the political actors, ambitions, alliances, and maneuvers behind the move to impeach Douglas—including the Nixon administration’s vain hope of deflecting attention from a surprisingly unpopular invasion of Cambodia—and follows the ill-advised effort to its ignominious conclusion, with consequences that resonate to this day.Marking a turning point in American politics, The Campaign to Impeach Justice William O. Douglas is a sobering, cautionary tale, a critical chapter in the history of constitutional malfeasance, and a reminder of the importance of judicial independence in a politically polarized age.
The impartial administration of justice and the accountability of government officials are two of the most strongly held American values. Yet these values are often in direct conflict with one another.
At the national level, the U.S. Constitution resolves this tension in favor of judicial independence, insulating judges from the undue influence of other political institutions, interest groups, and the general public. But at the state level, debate has continued as to the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. In this volume, constitutional scholar G. Alan Tarr focuses squarely on that debate. In part, the analysis is historical: how have the reigning conceptions of judicial independence and accountability emerged, and when and how did conflict over them develop? In part, the analysis is theoretical: what is the proper understanding of judicial independence and accountability?
Tarr concludes the book by identifying the challenges to state-level judicial independence and accountability that have emerged in recent decades, assessing the solutions offered by the competing sides, and offering proposals for how to strike the appropriate balance between independence and accountability.
The impartial administration of justice and the accountability of government officials are two of the most strongly held American values. Yet these values are often in direct conflict with one another.
At the national level, the U.S. Constitution resolves this tension in favor of judicial independence, insulating judges from the undue influence of other political institutions, interest groups, and the general public. But at the state level, debate has continued as to the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. In this volume, constitutional scholar G. Alan Tarr focuses squarely on that debate. In part, the analysis is historical: how have the reigning conceptions of judicial independence and accountability emerged, and when and how did conflict over them develop? In part, the analysis is theoretical: what is the proper understanding of judicial independence and accountability?
Tarr concludes the book by identifying the challenges to state-level judicial independence and accountability that have emerged in recent decades, assessing the solutions offered by the competing sides, and offering proposals for how to strike the appropriate balance between independence and accountability.
The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government.
This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. Judicial Independence and the American Constitution provocatively defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. Martin H. Redish explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence.
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