Описание: Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism--the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring i
Автор: P. Engel Название: Believing and Accepting ISBN: 9401057826 ISBN-13(EAN): 9789401057820 Издательство: Springer Рейтинг: Цена: 13974.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание: For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it;
Автор: P. Engel Название: Believing and Accepting ISBN: 0792362381 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780792362388 Издательство: Springer Рейтинг: Цена: 27251.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание: For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it;
Автор: Mccormick Название: Believing Against the Evidence ISBN: 0415818842 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780415818841 Издательство: Taylor&Francis Рейтинг: Цена: 22968.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание:
The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism.
In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief.
Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism--the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.
Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.
The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.
Автор: Mccormick Название: Believing Against the Evidence ISBN: 1138208949 ISBN-13(EAN): 9781138208940 Издательство: Taylor&Francis Рейтинг: Цена: 6889.00 р. Наличие на складе: Есть у поставщика Поставка под заказ.
Описание:
The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism.
In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief.
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