Описание: Preface
Part I Multi-Level Evolutionary Games
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Altruism in Groups
2.1 Classical Evolutionary Games and ESS; 2.2 New natural concept on evolutionary games; 2.3 Analysis of N-groups games with two strategies; 2.4 Some Examples; 2.5 Multiple Access Control; 2.6 Conclusions
Chapter 3 From Egoism to Altruism in Groups
3.1 System Model; 3.2 Utility Functions; 3.3 Computing the ESS; 3.4 Replicator Dynamics; 3.5 Optimization Issues; 3.6 Numerical Results; 3.7 Conclusion
Chapter 4 Evolutionary Games in Interacting Communities
4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies; 4.3 Two-community two-strategy model; 4.4 Replicator Dynamics; 4.5 Application to Hawk- Dove game; 4.6 Interacting communities on random graphs; 4.7 Conclusion; 4.8 Proofs
Chapter 5 Random Time Delays in Evolutionary Game Dynamics
5.1 Evolutionary Games; 5.2 Replicator dynamics with continuous random delays; 5.3 Replicator dynamics with one delayed strategy; 5.4 Conclusions; 5.5 Proof of Theorem 8; 5.6 Proof of Theorem 10
Chapter 6 Coupled State Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games
6.1 Standard Evolutionary Game Theory; 6.2 Individual State in EGT framework; 6.3 Two time-scales behavior; 6.4 Numerical Illustrations; 6.5 Conclusions and perspectives
Part II Epidemics/Information Diffusion
Chapter 7 Introduction
Chapter 8 Community Network with Equitable Partitions
8.1 Equitable Partitions; 8.2 Example; 8.3 Almost equitable partitions; 8.4 Conclusion
Chapter 9 Epidemic Spreading on Interconnected Networks
9.1 Effect on the Epidemic Threshold; 9.2 Effect of the Spatial Constraints of Interconnected Networks Chapter 10 Co-Evolution/ Adaptive Epidemics
10.1 Adaptive SIS model; 10.2 Comparison of the ASIS and AID model; 10.3 Conclusion
Part III Networking Games
Chapter 11 Introduction
Chapter 12 Beat your Rival Routing Games
12.0.1 Solution concept; 12.1 Model and Game Theoretic Formulations; 12.2 Bottleneck Routing Games; 12.3 Additive Routing Games; 12.4 Conclusions
Chapter 13 Network Formation Games with Teams
13.1 Network Formation Games with Teams: Basic definitions; 13.2 Network Formation Games with Teams: A Motivating Example; 13.3 Stability of Networks Against Teams Coalitions; 13.4 Dynamic formation of networks under coalitions; 13.5 Simulation Results; 13.6 Conclusions
Chapter 14 Peering vs Transit: A game theoretical model for autonomous systems connectivity
14.1 Introduction; 14.2 Related Work; 14.3 Scenario; 14.4 General Model; 14.5 Minimal Complexity Model (MCM); 14.6 Simulations; 14.7 Conclusions; 14.8 Appendix
Chapter 15 Network Neutrality
15.1 Introduction; 15.2 Computing the equilibrium; 15.3 Paradox and Price of Anarchy; 15.4 Collusions and Conclusions Part IV Intermittency in Complex Systems
Chapter 16 Introduction
17 Models with Adaptive Intermittent Behavior
17.1 Tangled Nature Model; 17.2 The Stochastic Replicator Model
Chapter 18 Outline of the Forecasting Procedure
18.1 Mean-Field Description; 18.2 Linear Stability Theory: Continuum Approximation; 18.3 TNM Mean Field Description; 18.4 SRM Mean Field Description
Chapter 19 Forecasting Procedure Based on Full Information
19.1 Procedure; 19.2 Results; 19.3 Analysis of the Stability Indicator Q(t); 19.4 Discussion
Chapter 20 Procedures with Incomplete Information
20.1 Interactions with Error; 20.2 New Procedure; 20.3 Results; 20.4
Chapter 21 Conclusion
