David Martimort, Perrin Lefebvre Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions 9781009285582

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Автор: David Martimort, Perrin Lefebvre
Название: Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions
ISBN: 9781009285582
Издательство: Cambridge Academ
Классификация:

Группы давления и лоббирование

Политэкономия

Агентское право

ISBN-10: 1009285580
Обложка/Формат: Paperback
Страницы: 75
Вес: 0.13 кг.
Дата издания: 02.03.2023
Серия: Elements in law, economics and politics
Язык: English
Иллюстрации: Worked examples or exercises
Размер: 151 x 229 x 10
Ключевые слова: Agency law,Political economy,Pressure groups & lobbying, POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / Economic Policy
Подзаголовок: A common agency model with moral hazard frictions
Ссылка на Издательство: Link
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Поставляется из: Англии
Описание: Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus are linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size.

Reform for Sale: A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions, David Martimort, Perrin Lefebvre